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Abstract The behavioral-urgency hypothesis (Franconeri &
Simons, Psychological Science, 19, 686–692, 2003) states that
dynamic visual properties capture human visual attention if they
signal the need for immediate action. The seminal example is the
potential collision of a looming object with one’s body.
However, humans are also capable of identifying with entities
outside one’s own body. Here we report evidence that behavioral
urgency transfers to an avatar in a simple 2-D computer game.
By controlling the avatar, the participant responded to shape
changes of the target in a visual search task. Simultaneously,
and completely irrelevant to the task, one of the objects on screen
could move. Responses were overall fastest when the target hap-
pened to be themoving object andwas on a collision course with
the avatar, as compared to when themoving target just passed by
the avatar or moved away from it. The effects on search efficien-
cy were less consistent, except that search was more efficient
overall whenever a target moved. Moreover, response speeding
was frequently accompanied by an increase in errors, consistent
with recent evidence that the urgency of looming is at least to a
large extent expressed in response processes rather than in per-
ceptual selection of the looming object. Thus, a general version
of the behavioral-urgency hypothesis also holds for external en-
tities with which the observer can identify.
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Visual perspective taking
Intuitively, we give perceptual priority to objects that move
toward us. Indeed, Franconeri and Simons (2003) found that
looming targets were detected more rapidly and more effi-
ciently than stationary targets. Because a receding stimulus
(i.e., the opposite of looming) did not show these signs of
capture (but see Abrams & Christ, 2005; Skarratt, Cole, &
Gellatly, 2009; Skarratt, Gellatly, Cole, Pilling, & Hulleman,
2014), Franconeri and Simons proposed the behavioral-ur-
gency hypothesis. This hypothesis states that dynamic events
are most likely capture attention when they signal potential
behavioral urgency—that is, when they require immediate
action, for example because they are possibly hazardous to
the observer’s physical integrity. A rapidly looming object
could cause injury, and thus calls for immediate evasive
action, whereas a receding or otherwise moving object does
not necessarily. Lin, Franconeri, and Enns (2008) provided
further support for this theory by directly comparing a condi-
tion in which the object would loom toward the observer and
one in which the object would loom but would appear to pass
by the observer (see also Lewis & Neider, 2015). Both types
of stimulus featured a retinal expansion, yet only the ap-
proaching stimulus captured attention, expressed by faster re-
sponse times (RTs) and shallower search slopes when the
moving stimulus was the target. Schmuckler, Collimore, and
Dannemiller (2007) reported similar findings with 5-month-
old infants.
A central assumption of the behavioral-urgency hypothesis
is that priority assignment occurs automatically (as in fast and
unintentional, driven by ingrained and potentially hardwired
mechanisms). Direct support for this comes from the way in
which attentional capture tasks are designed (Yantis, 1993;
Yantis & Jonides, 1984), in which observers are asked to
search a display for a target object that is defined by a partic-
ular feature (e.g., shape or category). The dynamic feature of
interest, such as looming, is then varied independent of this
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target-defining property. It can coincide with the target, but it
is as likely to coincide with any of the other items in the
display. Thus, the dynamic feature becomes irrelevant to the
task. If this feature still modulates performance (i.e., people
respond more rapidly to the target when it is dynamic, and/or
more slowly when one of the distractors is dynamic), it must
have gained priority in an automatic fashion. That is, despite
its irrelevance to the task, the feature is apparently still relevant
to the observer, as is indeed the case for looming.
The automaticity of processing notwithstanding, Skarratt
et al. (2014) recently raised the possibility that the processing
advantage enjoyed by looming motion is mediated not so
much by attentional mechanisms as by postattentional, re-
sponse preparation processes. In one of their earlier studies,
Skarratt et al. (2009) found that both looming and receding
stimuli were equivalent in attracting attention. The slopes of
the search functions for these two stimulus types were
shallower than those for static stimuli, yet were equal to
each other. If looming stimuli are selected more efficiently
by attention than are receding stimuli, one would expect the
slope for looming stimuli to be shallower than that of receding
stimuli. Nevertheless, an important difference was that the
overall RTs for looming stimuli were still shorter than those
for receding ones. This additive pattern led Skarratt et al.
(2014) to argue that although attentional capture might occur
for dynamic stimuli in general, the response benefits for
looming stimuli might be particularly caused by priming of
the visuomotor system. Skarratt et al. (2014) found further
evidence for this in a temporal-order judgment task (TOJ)
using looming stimuli. The TOJ task provides a perceptual
measure of prior entry (Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001;
Spence, Shore, & Klein, 2001; Weiss & Scharlau, 2011), be-
cause attended stimuli are perceived earlier in time than
nonattended stimuli when both are presented simultaneously
(Stelmach & Herdman, 1991). Skarratt et al. (2014) reasoned
that if the looming advantage is mediated by the motor system
rather than by attention, the TOJ should yield no differences
between looming and receding stimuli. They indeed found
this to be the case: Moving objects led to prior entry, but the
amounts did not differ for the two types of motion direction
(looming or receding). Together with the overall speeding of
RTs in the irrelevant feature search, this suggests at least a
large role for response preparation processes in speeding per-
formance under conditions of behavioral urgency.
The present study: Dissociating behavioral urgency
from one’s own body
Here we further investigated the behavioral-urgency hypothe-
sis. In our view, the strength of this hypothesis is not so much
that it assumes a strong role of behavioral relevance in atten-
tional capture (after all, many accounts assume that
mechanisms of prioritization have evolved exactly because
they turned out to be adaptive in avoiding harm or spotting
useful information), but that it opens up a way of investigating
how sophisticated our behavioral-urgency detection mecha-
nisms are. To illustrate, a simple retinal expansion detection
algorithm may be a very crude but still useful method of
implementing the behavioral urgency of an approaching ob-
ject (which works fine for, e.g., the normal house fly; Marr,
1982). What Lin et al. (2008) have shown is that for humans,
the system apparently is more sophisticated than that, using
higher-level algorithms to detect not only expanding objects,
but also whether an object really requires action, or whether it
will pass without consequences. Here we take this idea a step
further. Humans have the unique ability to identify with other
entities. In fact, we often imagine being somebody else, or
even something else. For instance, when we read a book we
experience events from the view of the story’s protagonist.
The ability to identify with other entities probably also under-
lies what is known as visual perspective taking, in which par-
ticipants are asked to imagine viewing the scene from another
person’s perspective and to judge, for example, object visibil-
ity and position for that person (Amorim, 2003; Amorim,
Glasauer, Corpinot, & Berthoz, 1997; Creem et al., 2001;
David et al., 2006; Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981;
Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Salatas & Flavell, 1976).
Work by Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and
Scott (2010) has moreover shown that observers may auto-
matically adopt another person’s viewpoint (even when it is
irrelevant to the task).When observers were asked to judge the
number of dots they saw, RTs were influenced by the number
of dots that a person pictured in the display could see (how-
ever, see Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes,
2014, for evidence that this may be merely an effect of
directing attention to specific dots—comparable to what is
known as gaze cueing, Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; see also
Cole, Smith, & Atkinson, 2015).
Our study did not concern visual perspective taking, as
such. Visual perspective taking is just one example of how
people identify with an external entity. Another case in which
this ability becomes clear is when people control an object
(such as the car one drives) or a character in a computer game
(referred to as an avatar). Work by Yee and Bailenson (2007,
2009) and Pena, Hancock, and Merola (2009) has shown that
participants tune their behavior to the virtual appearance of
their avatar (called the Proteus effect). For example, if their
avatar is taller than other virtual characters, participants be-
come more confident in virtual negotiations. The present
study focused on the question of whether we also adapt our
attentional and/or motor priorities in relation to an external
entity that we control. More specifically, in the present study
we investigated whether objects that approach an observer’s
avatar, rather than the observer him- or herself, capture atten-
tion. If so, this would lend further support to the idea that
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attentional and/or motor priorities depend on high-level cog-
nitive representations of what is currently behaviorally urgent,
rather than lower-level hardwired motion detection mecha-
nisms such as simple retinal expansion sensors. To our knowl-
edge, no studies have yet investigated whether attentional ef-
fects can also transfer to an avatar. Especially important for
current theories would be the demonstration that even what
are considered automatic processes of prioritization can trans-
fer to external entities, since this would imply that although a
process itself may be automatic, the representation to which it
is assigned may change.
The BWhack the Egg^ task
To investigate whether behavioral urgency applies to external
but still relevant entities, we adapted Lin et al.’s (2008) visual
search task to a 2-D computer game that we refer to as
BWhack the Egg.^ The series of events is illustrated in
Fig. 1. As in Lin et al., participants searched an array of cir-
cular shapes for an egg-shaped target. However, here they
responded by rapidly rotating an avatar toward the egg, as
well as by indicating its orientation (upright or lying down).
The avatar was a character viewed from the top. To encourage
the feeling of unity, the avatar was under the continuous con-
trol of the observer throughout a trial and responded in real
time to keypresses. To add to the game play, the avatar would
shatter the egg with a hammer once it was correctly aligned
with the target, with befitting accompanying sounds.
Although a simpler experimental setup might have been pos-
sible, we deliberately chose this implementation in order to
increase participant engagement with the avatar and task. At
the same time, we avoided a more realistic, and therefore more
complex, environment in order to retain maximal control over
the experimental variables.
Concurrent with the revelation of the target, any one of the
objects present in the search field could start moving, an event
that did not correlate with the target (which observers were
explicitly made aware of). Since the movement of the object,
as well as its direction, was completely uninformative about
the target’s position or orientation, any motion-related advan-
tage should be regarded as automatic. The crucial condition
was when the object moved straight toward the avatar, as
compared to a number of control conditions. These control
conditions included a condition in which the object moved
in the general direction of the avatar, but would pass it by, as
well as the mirrored versions of the toward- and pass-by di-
rections. Here the movement followed the exact same trajec-
tories, but always away from the avatar, in order to control for
other potential (e.g., visual) differences between the two
movement directions. To control for motion-related visibility
issues, the remaining objects were also continuously jiggling
around their respective positions.
Our predictions were as follows: If an approaching move-
ment toward one’s external representation is prioritized, then
we should observe faster responses when the object turns out
to be the target. In contrast, if looming toward the observer’s
own visual system is essential, no signs of prioritization
should be found. In addition, prioritization might operate on
perceptual selection, on response preparation, or both. In the
first case, we should see an improvement in terms of search
slopes for targets moving toward the avatar. In the latter case,
improvements should be limited to overall RT.
We report three experiments that showed the same overall
pattern. In Experiment 1, the avatar was the only object pres-
ent toward which the search items could move. To control for
the idea that priority might be given to items approaching any
salient stimulus at the edge of the screen, and not necessarily
an avatar, Experiment 2 included a simple but salient inani-
mate object (a uniquely colored oval) at the opposite side of
the screen, to control for any visual presence at the display
side. In Experiment 3, this inanimate object was replaced with
an avatar look-a-like, which shared the exact visual features
with the avatar but was still inanimate. In this way, we could
assess whether actually controlling the avatar is crucial, or
whether looking like a human figure is in itself sufficient.
We point out that the player’s own avatar only started moving
at a buttonpress or mouse movement, from which moment the
RTwas recorded. Hence, our measurements were not affected
by the avatar’s motion itself. We furthermore decided to turn
the displays by 90 deg in Experiments 2 and 3 (see Fig. 2), to
control for the possibility that the downward motion in the
displays of Experiment 1 was interpreted as motion toward
the observer’s own body (e.g., toward the legs under the ta-
ble). Furthermore, the task of controlling the avatar and
responding to the targets was made easier, in order to reduce
the relatively large number of errors found in Experiment 1.
Experiments
Method
Participants Fifty-four students from the VU University be-
tween 18 and 30 years old (average 24) participated, of which
18 (16 female, two male) in Experiment 1, 20 (eight female,
12male) in Experiment 2, and 16 in Experiment 3 (ten female,
six male). They signed informed consent and received course
credits or money. All testing was done in accordance with the
ethical guidelines of the faculty, as assessed by the local eth-
ical review board. All participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve as to the purpose
of the experiment.
Apparatus The experiments were run in a dimly lit cubicle,
on a PC with a 19-in. CRT screen (1,024 × 768 resolution,
Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:2669–2683 2671
120 Hz), viewed from a 70-cm distance. Stimulus presentation
and response recording were done in E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, 2012).
Stimuli In Experiment 1, the search items on the display
consisted of four or eight white circles [1.92 degree of visual
angle (dva), CIE(.291, .350), 100 cd/m2] positioned on the
horizontal meridian of the screen. In Experiments 2 and 3,
these circles were aligned along the vertical meridian and
maximally amounted to six. All circles in the search display
were slightly vibrating (randomly jiggling 2 pixels per frame
along the x- and y-axes) around their position, in an attempt to
(a) add to the gameplay, (b) mask the target shape change, and
(c) mask the motion onset of the moving element. A target was
either a horizontal or vertical oval with, respectively, half the
height or the width of a distractor circle. In Experiment 1, the
avatar (2.78 dva wide) was positioned at the bottom of the
screen, centered on the horizontal axis. It consisted of gray
Fig. 2 Example display for Experiments 2 and 3. As compared to
Experiment 1, the whole search display was rotated 90 deg, and the
avatar was now placed at the left or right side of the screen instead of
only at the bottom. On the opposite side from the avatar a blue oval






Fig. 1 Illustration of a (pass-by) trial. The participant’s avatar was
located at the bottom of the screen; the task was to rotate the avatar to
align it with the egg-shaped target, after which the avatar would smash it.
Simultaneous with the target appearance, one of the objects could start
moving in one of the indicated directions. The moving item could be
either the target or a distractor. After hitting the target, the participant
had to rotate the avatar back to the middle position to initiate the next
trial. Labels and arrows of course were not visible in the real trials
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shoulders, a skin-colored head, and black hair. In Experiments
2 and 3, the avatar was presented at the center of the left or
right edge of the screen (alternating per block and with the
initial side counterbalanced across participants) and faced the
screen center. In Experiment 2, a dark blue oval [50 ×
100 pixels, CIE(.16, .05), 29 cd/m2] was placed at the opposite
edge of the screen from where the avatar was located, and in
Experiment 3 this blue oval was replaced by an inactive copy
of the avatar facing the center of the screen.
Design Experiment 1 consisted of nine blocks containing 120
trials, of which the first block was practice. The first factor was
Set Size, which could be 4 (40 trials) or 8 (80 trials). The
second factor was Moving Item: There could either be no
moving item (none, 20 % of all trials) or a moving item
(80 % of trials) that was either a distractor circle (distractor)
or target oval (target). The moving item was the target on one
quarter of the trials when the set size was 4 (eight out of 32
trials), and on one eighth of the trials when set size was 8
(eight out of 64 trials). One of the items was randomly selected
to be the target. The third factor was Movement Direction. An
item could move in one of four possible directions, with each
direction occurring equally often (eight trials for each direc-
tion when the set size was 4, and 16 trials when the set size
was 8). On toward-avatar trials, the item would move directly
toward the avatar. On pass-by-avatar trials, the item moved
toward the side of the avatar, but in a direction that would miss
it. On toward-opposite and pass-by-opposite trials, the item
moved in the samemanner as on toward and pass-by trials, but
now always toward the opposite side of the screen. All of the
above factors were mixed within blocks.
Experiments 2 and 3 consisted of 11 blocks containing 100
trials, of which the first block was practice. The factor Set Size
could be 4 (40 trials) or 6 (60 trials). The maximum set size
was reduced because the vertical meridian was less long than
the horizontal, and thus allowed fewer items to be placed with
sufficient space between them. The moving item was the tar-
get on one quarter of the trials when the set size was 4 (eight
out of 32 trials), and one sixth of the trials when the set size
was 6 (eight out of 48 trials). In all experiments, all of the
above factors were mixed within blocks.
Procedure Participants were given verbal and written instruc-
tions about the task before they commenced the experiment.
They were made aware that, when present, the moving ele-
ment was unlikely to be a target, although on certain occasions
this was possible. No reference was made to identifying with
the avatar. We only explained to participants what the task was
and how to operate the avatar.
A trial started with the presentation of the avatar, which
was facing the center of the screen. After 500 ms, the array
of vibrating circles appeared. After approximately 2 s, one of
the circles turned into the egg shape and, simultaneously, it or
any other circle could start moving from its position, with a
speed of 10 dva per second. At the same time, response
measurements started. Whenever a moving circle or oval
reached the edge of the screen or was about to collide with
the avatar, it faded into the background. Thus, the item
never actually collided with the avatar, and there were no
negative consequences or penalties in the game when it
reached the avatar.
In Experiment 1, the avatar had to be rotated to the oval
target by pressing the B1,^ B7,^ B3,^ or B9^ key on the numeric
keypad, depending on the target’s location and orientation.
When the target was located to the left of the avatar, the avatar
had to be rotated with the B7^ key when this target was a
vertical oval, or with B1^ when it was horizontal. Likewise,
the avatar had to be moved with the B9^ or B3^ key when the
target was located to its right. The RTwas defined as the time
from target revelation to a participant’s first keypress. Any
subsequent keypresses were not important for the data analy-
sis. Since their control over the avatar was continuous, partic-
ipants had to hold down the correct key until the nose of the
avatar was aligned with the target, after which the avatar
would automatically smash the egg with an emerging
hammer.
In Experiment 1, choosing the correct response key out of
the four possible keys proved to be quite difficult for partici-
pants, resulting in high error rates. To simplify the task, we let
participants respond with the mouse instead of the keyboard in
Experiments 2 and 3, and used two separate Bmodalities^ of
the mouse to respond to the orientation and position of the
target. Participants could rotate the avatar by sliding themouse
up or down, and they pressed the left mouse button if the oval
was horizontal and the right button if it was vertical. The RT
was measured as the time between the revelation of the target
oval and the buttonpress. The avatar would not strike until it
faced the target and one of the mouse buttons had been
pressed. These two actions could be done simultaneously
and did not need to be performed in a specific order. A re-
sponse was counted as incorrect if the wrong mouse button
was pressed or when the avatar was initially rotated in the
opposite direction from the one in which the target oval was
located.
A high- or low-frequency sound was played for a correct or
incorrect response, after which an image of a fried egg would
appear at the previous location of the egg shape, following a
correct response, and an image of a dizzy duckling, after an
incorrect response. Participants then had to rotate the avatar
back to its starting orientation to start the next trial. When a
participant initially rotated the avatar in the wrong direction
(e.g., to the opposite half of the screen from where the target
oval was located) or pressed a button that did not correspond
to the orientation of the oval, the response was registered as
being incorrect. To promote the gameplay, participants still
had to finish the trial in this case, by aligning the avatar with
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the egg to smash it and then returning to the starting orienta-
tion. In addition, to motivate participants to respond as quickly
as possible, the positive or negative feedback depended on a
moving RT criterion of 200 ms above the running average of
the past ten trials (starting with 1,500 ms at each block). When
participants responded correctly, but too slow, the response
feedback was given as incorrect (in the form of the oval turn-
ing to a small chick and a short quacking sound), but for
purposes of the analyses, the response was registered as cor-
rect. There was a break after each block, and the experiments
took about 70 to 90 min.
Results
The measure of interest was the target identification RT (cor-
responding to the buttonpress). The mouse movement latency
did not provide a clean measure, since the necessity and extent
of moving the mouse differed per condition. In Experiment 1,
four participants who made more than 30 % errors were re-
moved from the data set. Trials with erroneous responses
(19 % in Exp. 1, 5.5 % in Exp. 2, and 9.6 % in Exp. 3) were
removed from the data set, and so were trials with responses
that differed more than 2.5 SDs from the participant’s mean
(2.5 % in Exp. 1, 2.6 % in Exp. 2, 2.5 % in Exp. 3). The
resulting RTs are displayed in Figs. 3a, 4a, and 5a. For con-
venience, and because the results are very similar for all ex-
periments, Fig. 6a displays the results collapsed across
experiments.
To assess the effects of movement direction on search, we
first performed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for each ex-
periment with Set Size (low, high), Moving Item (distractor,
target), and Movement Direction (toward avatar, pass by ava-
tar, toward opposite, pass by opposite) as factors. Note that the
no-movement condition was left out of this particular analysis,
since it could not be fully crossed with the other factors (as it
had no movement direction). This analysis revealed signifi-
cant main effects in all experiments of set size [Exp. 1, F(1,
13) = 179.81, p < .005, ηp
2 = .93; Exp. 2, F(1, 19) = 159.88, p
< .001, ηp
2 = .89; Exp. 3, F(1, 15) = 158.80, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.91], moving item [Exp. 1, F(1, 13) = 59.47, p < .005, ηp
2 =
.82; Exp. 2, F(1, 19) = 204.53, p < .001, ηp
2 = .92; Exp. 3, F(1,
15) = 116.92, p < .001, ηp
2 = .87], and movement direction
[Exp. 1, F(3, 39) = 6.41, p < .005, ηp
2 = .33; Exp. 2, F(3, 57) =
4.99, p < .005, ηp
2 = .21; Exp. 3, F(3, 45) = 4.34, p < .05, ηp
2 =
.23]. Responses were overall faster for the lower set size, were
faster when the moving item was the target, and were fastest
when the moving item moved toward the avatar. All experi-
ments also showed a significant Moving Item × Set Size in-
teraction [Exp. 1, F(1, 13) = 16.76, p < .005, ηp
2 = .56; Exp. 2,
F(1, 19) = 46.126, p < .005, ηp
2 = .70; Exp. 3, F(1, 15) =
28.40, p < .005, ηp
2 = .65], reflecting the fact that the set size
effects (and thus the search slopes) were smaller when the
target was moving than when a distractor was moving.
Furthermore, in Experiments 1 and 2 we observed a reliable
Movement Direction × Moving Item interaction [Exp. 1, F(3,
39) = 3.09, p < .05, ηp
2 = .19; Exp. 2, F(3, 57) = 4.46, p < .05,
ηp
2 = .19]: RTs were especially affected when the moving
object was a target and moved toward the avatar. This
Movement Direction × Moving Item interaction was not reli-
able in Experiment 3 [F(3, 45) = 1.20, p = .32, ηp
2 = .07]. The
specific effects underlying these overall ANOVA results are
fleshed out next.
Relative RT effects The RT benefits for targets moving to-
ward the avatar become especially apparent when comparing
the costs and benefits for each movement direction against the
no-movement baseline condition. These are shown in
Figs. 3b, 4b, and 5b for Experiments 1–3, respectively.
Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that in all experiments
a moving distractor caused significant RT costs in all move-
ment directions, as compared to the no-movement condition
(all ts > 5.24, all ps < .005). When the target was the moving
object, response benefits were greatest when it was ap-
proaching the avatar [toward avatar vs. no moving item:
Exp. 1, t(13) = 5.35, p < .005; Exp. 2, t(19) = 7.09, p <
.005; Exp. 3, t(1, 15) = 3.07, p < .01]. There were also reliable
benefits when the target passed by the avatar (pass by avatar
vs. no moving item: all ts > 2.60, ps < .05), but importantly, in
all cases these benefits were significantly smaller than when
the target approached the avatar (toward vs. pass by avatar: ts
> 2.28, ps < .05). Targets moving in the directions opposite the
avatar did not elicit reliable response benefits (vs. no moving
item) in Experiment 1 (ts < 1.84, ps > .09), but did so in
Experiments 2 and 3 (all ts > 2.20, ps < .05). Most importantly,
these benefits were all also significantly smaller than those
yielded by a target that approached the avatar (all ts > 2.28,
ps < .05). In Experiment 3, the difference in the RT benefits of
a target moving toward the avatar versus passing by the op-
ponent failed to reach significance by a small margin (ts <
1.82, p > .08).
The pattern of results becomes especially clear when the
data are collapsed across experiments, as they are depicted in
Fig. 6b. Separate ANOVAs with Experiment as a between-
subjects factor revealed no interaction between Experiment
and Movement Direction for either moving-item type (Fs <
1.17, ps > .33), which underlines the similarity of the results
between experiments. With moving targets, the main effect of
movement direction [F(3, 138) = 17.56, p < .001] was signif-
icant. Separate analyses showed that all moving-target condi-
tion RTs were significantly faster than the no-movement base-
line (ts > 5.0, ps < .001), but more importantly, the RTs for a
target moving toward the avatar were significantly faster than
those for targets moving in any of the other directions (all ts >
5.73, ps < .001).
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Slope effects To assess search efficiency, we looked at the
slope effects for all moving conditions as compared to the
no-movement baseline condition, in separate 2 (movement
vs. no movement) × 2 (set size low and high) ANOVAs for
Fig. 3 Results of Experiment 1. (A) Mean response times (RTs) for
conditions in which the moving item was absent or was a distractor or
the target, plotted against set size. (B) RT costs (for moving distractors,
positive) and benefits (moving targets, negative) for each movement
direction, relative to the condition in which no moving item was
present. (C) Search slopes for these same items relative to the slopes of
the condition in which no moving item was present. Error bars represent
the within-subjects 95 % confidence intervals of the mean differences
relative to the no-movement baseline
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moving targets and moving distractors. These differences in
slopes are shown in Figs. 3c, 4c, and 5c, whereas the
underlying absolute slope values are listed in Table 1. The
analysis revealed that in Experiments 1 and 2, in the
Fig. 4 Results of Experiment 2. (A) Mean response times (RTs) for
conditions in which the moving item was absent or was a distractor or
the target, plotted against set size. (B) RT costs (for moving distractors,
positive) and benefits (moving targets, negative) for each movement
direction, relative to the condition in which no moving item was
present. (C) Search slopes for these same items relative to the slopes of
the condition in which no moving item was present. Error bars represent
the within-subjects 95 % confidence intervals of the mean differences
relative to the no-movement baseline
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moving-distractor condition, search was less efficient than in
the no-movement baseline for each movement direction (Exp.
1, Fs > 5.28, ps < .01; Exp. 2, Fs > 7.18, ps < .05), except for
distractors moving toward the avatar in Experiment 2 [F(1,
13) = 0.54, p = .47]. In Experiment 3, there was little effect of
a moving distractor on search efficiency relative to the no-
movement baseline, except for distractors passing by the ava-
tar, in which case search was significantly less efficient [F(1,
15) = 5.53, p < .05].
For search in the moving-target conditions, the results were
ambiguous, with no clear pattern favoring targets specifically
moving toward the avatar. In Experiment 1, we observed
Fig. 5 Results of Experiment 3. (A) Mean response times (RTs) for
conditions in which the moving item was absent or was a distractor or
the target, plotted against set size. (B) RT costs (for moving distractors,
positive) and benefits (moving targets, negative) for each movement
direction, relative to the condition in which no moving item was
present. (C) Search slopes for these same items relative to the slopes of
the condition in which no moving item was present. Error bars represent
the within-subjects 95 % confidence intervals of the mean differences
relative to the no-movement baseline
Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:2669–2683 2677
trends toward more efficient search for both of the toward
conditions (Fs > 2.84, ps < .11), regardless of whether this
was toward the avatar or toward themirror position (away from
the avatar). There was little evidence for a slope benefit in the
pass-by conditions (Fs < 0.09, ps > .77). In Experiment 2,
search in the moving-target conditions was as efficient as in
Fig. 6 Results collapsed over Experiments 1–3. (A) Mean response
times (RTs) for conditions in which the moving item was absent or was
a distractor or the target, plotted against low (4) and high (8 in Exp. 1, 6 in
Exps. 2 and 3) set size. (B) RTcosts (for moving distractors, positive) and
benefits (moving targets, negative) for each movement direction, relative
to the condition in which no moving item was present. (C) Search slopes
for these same items relative to the slopes of the condition in which no
moving item was present. Error bars represent the within-subjects 95 %
confidence intervals of the mean differences relative to the no-movement
baseline
2678 Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:2669–2683
the no-movement condition when the target moved away from
the avatar in any direction (Fs < 0.23, ps > .42), but was more
efficient when the target moved in the general direction of the
avatar and also when it passed by (Fs > 4.5, p < .05). In
Experiment 3, search for moving targets was in general more
efficient than for no moving targets, especially when the target
moved toward or passed the opponent [F(1, 15) = 7.87, p < .05,
and F(1, 15) = 4.74, p < .05]. Figure 6c depicts the slope effect
data collapsed across experiments. ANOVAs for moving
distractors and targets with Movement Direction as a within-
subjects and Experiment as a between-subjects factor revealed
no significant effects. A separate analysis against the no-
movement baseline revealed that search was overall less
efficient when there was any moving distractor (ts > 3.15, ps
< .001), and was just as efficient for targets moving past the
avatar [t(48) = 1.12, p = .27] or in the opposite direction [t(48)
= 1.29, p = .20]. Targets that either moved toward the avatar or
to the equivalent location at the opposite end were found more
efficiently [t(48) = 3.23, p < .005, and t(48) = 2.82, p < .01,
respectively]. Taken together, the evidence thus suggests an
efficiency benefit for specific motion trajectories, rather than
due to the avatar. Note that targets moving either toward the
avatar or in the mirrored direction on average moved more
toward the center, which may have yielded a slight benefit in
search efficiency.
Errors The error rates for all conditions in Experiments 1–3
are displayed in Table 2. ANOVAs were performed on the
error rates, again with Set Size, Moving Item, and
Movement Direction as factors. These revealed no significant
effects for Experiment 2, but for Experiment 1 they showed
that participants made significantly more errors when the
moving itemwas a target than when it was a distractor moving
item [F(1, 13) = 5.51, p < .05, ηp
2 = .30]. Errors were also
significantly higher for set size 8 than for set size 4 [set size:
F(1, 13) = 7.97, p < .05, ηp
2 = .38]. Additionally, errors were
higher when items followed a pass-by or toward-avatar vec-
tor, as compared to their mirrored directions [movement di-
rection: F(3, 39) = 5.78, p < .005, ηp
2 = .31]. Set size had a
greater effect on errors for moving targets than for moving
distractors [Moving Item × Set Size: F(1, 13) = 4.68, p =
.05, ηp
2 = .27]. Furthermore, error rates increased more for
Table 1 Slope effects (assumed to be the inspection time, in
milliseconds, per item present in the display) across experiments for the
various moving-object conditions
Condition Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
No moving item 15 32 29
Target toward 13 11 21
Target pass by 22 8 20
Target mirror 7 25 10
Target away 17 27 13
Distractor toward 31 37 37
Distractor pass by 25 58 45
Distractor mirror 26 47 37
Distractor away 30 55 41
Table 2 Error rates of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 for conditions in which the moving item was a target or a distractor, or in which no moving item was
present, in combination with the possible movement directions and set sizes
Experiment 1 Movement Direction and Set Size
Pass by Mir. Toward Mir. Pass by Av. Toward Av. None
Moving Item 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 8
Distractor 13 % 14 % 12 % 13 % 16 % 17 % 19 % 18 % – –
Target 15 % 17 % 15 % 23 % 21 % 32 % 18 % 23 % – –
No moving item – – – – – – – – 8 % 9 %
Experiment 2 Movement Direction and Set Size
Pass by Obj. Toward Obj. Pass by Av. Toward Av. None
4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6
Distractor 4 % 6 % 5 % 5 % 5 % 6 % 7 % 6 % – –
Target 7 % 5 % 7 % 5 % 6 % 7 % 9 % 7 % – –
No moving item – – – – – – – – 4 % 5 %
Experiment 3 Movement Direction and Set Size
Pass by Op. Toward Op. Pass by Av. Toward Av. None
4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6
Distractor 6 % 6 % 6 % 7 % 7 % 6 % 8 % 8 % – –
Target 8 % 10 % 8 % 7 % 11 % 11 % 12 % 14 % – –
No moving item – – – – – – – – 6 % 6 %
Mir. empty location on opposite screen side of avatar, Av. avatar, Obj. object on other side of screen, Op. opponent figure on other side of screen
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targets moving in the pass-by and toward-avatar directions
than for distractors moving in those same directions
[Moving Item × Movement Direction: F(3, 39) = 3.01, p <
.05, ηp
2 = .19]. Planned comparisons revealed that error rates
were significantly higher for all conditions in which a moving
item was present, as compared to when no moving item was
present (ts > 2.45, ps < .03). For Experiment 3, a main effect
was found for moving item [F(1, 15) = 8.57, p < .05, ηp
2 =
.36]: Participants made more errors when the moving item
was a target. We also observed a main effect of movement
direction [F(3, 45) = 5.45, p < .05, ηp
2 = .27]. Separate com-
parisons revealed that participants made the most erroneous
responses when an item moved toward the avatar rather than
in any of the other directions [vs. pass by avatar, t(15) = 2.42,
p < .05; vs. pass by opponent, t(15) = 2.56, p < .05; vs. toward
opponent, t(15) = 2.11, p = .052].
General discussion
We believe the data support a number of conclusions. First,
moving items appear to capture attention in general, regardless
of their trajectory. Moving targets led to faster responses and
to overall more efficient search than conditions with moving
distractors, despite the fact that the motion was irrelevant to
the task. This replicates work by Franconeri and Simons
(2003), who also identified the onset of two-dimensional
transposition to be an attention-capturing feature. Second,
the important novel finding was the additional speeding of
responses for targets moving toward the observer’s avatar.
Crucially, RTs were faster than for the condition in which
the object passed by the avatar, or for the mirrored directions.
Moreover, there was no consistent speeding for targets mov-
ing toward a salient other object in the display (the blue oval of
Exp. 2, or an inanimate opponent that was identical in appear-
ance to the avatar in Exp. 3). The findings thus show that an
object is not only prioritized when it is looming toward the
observer’s own body or head, but also when it is approaching
an external representation of one’s self.
At the same time, we also observed an important difference
with some of the earlier findings with looming stimuli:
Although an approaching target led to overall RT benefits, it
did not lead to consistent benefits in search efficiency over
other target directions, as would be expressed in shallower
search slopes. Slopes were substantially shallower for
moving-target than for moving-distractor conditions, suggest-
ing attentional capture, but this was the case for all movement
directions. This lack of a clear slope effect is not unique.
Looking at several previous studies investigating attentional
capture, search slope benefits seemed to occur mainly for set
sizes up to 4, whereas for higher set sizes the benefits were
often expressed in terms of overall RTs (Franconeri & Simons,
2003; Gellatly, Cole, & Blurton, 1999; Humphreys, Olivers,
& Yoon, 2006; Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Yantis & Johnson,
1990; Yantis & Jonides, 1996). In the present study we used
set sizes up to 8, which is outside the range for which slope
effects have typically been found. If efficiency benefits are
indeed confined to smaller set sizes, this would suggest that
the automatic perceptual prioritization of looming within a set
of items might be contingent on observers already attending to
that set. A number of findings suggest that spatial attention
may be limited to four individual items at a time (see, e.g.,
Cowan, 2001; Olivers, 2008, for reviews). If some initial spa-
tial attention is needed in order to detect looming (or, poten-
tially, other properties), this would explain the limited slope
effects. However, we point out that the study that directly
inspired ours, by Lin et al. (2008), did find clear slope benefits
for approaching targets, even though they used set sizes 3 and
6. An Battention-limited attentional capture^ explanation is
thus not very satisfactory, not least because it would oppose
its own purpose of attentional capture.
Instead, our pattern of results connects better with the idea
put forward by Skarratt and colleagues (Skarratt et al., 2009;
Skarratt et al., 2014), that approaching stimuli prime the
visuomotor response system rather than cause attentional cap-
ture. In all three experiments, the absolute RT effects for tar-
gets collision-bound with the avatar were significantly greater
than in the other movement directions, whereas there was little
to no difference between the slopes. Instead, slopes were over-
all shallower across the moving-target conditions (and steeper
when distractors were moving). This suggests a two-tier
mechanism—namely, one in which attention is initially cap-
tured by the motion dynamics, which is then followed by a
later process in which the response is speeded when the se-
lected stimulus also appears to be approaching.
One might argue that approaching objects did not result in
shallower slopes because they never actually collided with the
avatar. This might be true, but of course it is also exactly the
point: If attentional capture depends on such contextual
knowledge, it is no longer automatic. One might also argue
that the lack of an effect on search slopes was due to a simple
floor effect. However, with average slopes values around
16 ms/item for targets in the motion conditions, there was
room for further improvement. Furthermore, at the other end
of the RT spectrum, we observed no sign that looming
distractors led to slower or less efficient search. Distractors
moving toward the avatar did not interfere more with search
than did a distractor moving in any of the other directions,
which is not predicted from an attentional-capture stance.
The lack of a distractor effect is consistent with the findings
of Lin et al. (2008), who also observed equal performance for
all of their moving-distractor conditions. Thus, both when the
object moved toward the observer’s body and when it moved
toward the observer’s avatar, prioritization of an object on a
collision course was only apparent when this object was the
target. One possibility is that approaching distractors also
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initially engage more attention (which should initially
lead to additional RT costs), but this is then compensated
for by speeding up the search for (and responding to) the
actual target, because the observer feels the urge to react
quickly.
One might expect that when participants experience an
increased sense of urgency to respond, they will also tend to
make more mistakes. Experiment 1 indeed showed signs of
such a speed–accuracy trade-off, in that errors increased when
targets were moving in the avatar’s direction in general (to-
ward and passing by). A similar trend was present in
Experiment 3, regardless of whether the item was a target or
a distractor. Experiment 2 showed no significant differences in
error rates. Given these inconsistencies, we are reluctant to
draw too strong conclusions, but in any case, such trade-offs
would provide further support for a large response-based com-
ponent (i.e., an urge to act rapidly, regardless of whether it is
the correct action) to behavioral-urgency effects.
One might question whether it is necessary for participants
to control the avatar or whether paying attention to its location
would be sufficient to elicit the prioritization effects that we
found. Even though it is possible that the effect is driven by
the fact that participants attend to the avatar’s location during
the task, this would not necessarily be helpful. For one thing,
allocating attentional resources to the avatar would diminish
the resources available to find the oval target, and therefore
would not be a wise decision. Furthermore, performing the
task correctly did not really require maintaining updated in-
formation about the avatar. One needed to know the avatar’s
initial position to determine whether and in which direction
the avatar needed to be rotated (depending on where the target
appeared), but this was the same for trial after trial. That said,
it may well be possible that part of the identification process
involves attention, in that an entity that one regards as oneself
automatically attracts attention. Evidence for this has come
from Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012), who found that simple
geometric shapes that were labeled Byou^ (referring to the
participant) became more salient in a subsequent visual atten-
tion task. The present effects may then reflect the fact that the
moving item approached the current focus of attention, rather
than that it approached a representation of the self as such.
However, if a representation of the self always correlates with
attending to oneself, these mechanisms would be difficult to
disentangle. In fact, attention might be the very mechanism by
which we Btag^ representations of ourselves in outer space.
At a general level, the present findings resemble the effects
of an avatar on other behavior in either a virtual or the real
world. Previous studies have already shown that we are able to
identify ourselves or empathize with our avatar and to adapt
our behavior accordingly (Yee & Bailenson, 2007, 2009; Yee,
Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 2009). Studies into visual perspec-
tive taking have furthermore shown that we can imagine view-
ing a scene through the eyes of another agent and can interact
with the scene as such (Amorim, 2003; Amorim et al., 1997;
Creem et al., 2001; David et al., 2006; Michelon & Zacks,
2006; Zacks, Vettel, & Michelon, 2003). Here we add the
finding that we adapt our visuomotor behavior to our external
representative and react to stimuli that interact with this avatar
as if they were interacting with our own body, despite the fact
that these stimuli were completely irrelevant to the task.
Furthermore, the level at which this interaction occurs appears
to involve an avatar-centered spatial reference frame, since it
distinguishes between approaching and passing items—some-
thing that has been referred to as BLevel 2^ perspective taking
in the visual perspective-taking literature (with BLevel 1^ re-
ferring to the mere judgment whether or not an object is at all
visible to the other person; Flavell et al., 1981; Salatas &
Flavell, 1976). Thus, once assigned, the process operates rath-
er automatically, but how it is assigned is subject to higher-
order identification processes.
However, we emphasize that we do not claim that ob-
servers are Bseeing what the avatar sees.^ We do not assume
that observers actually take the avatar’s visual perspective.
Thus, our results do not depend on whether observers believe
that the avatar can (within its virtual world) actually see the
object or not (cf. Cole et al., 2015). Instead, we see the evi-
dence as being consistent with the more general idea that
observers identify with the avatar because it is the object that
one controls. The avatar becomes, to some extent, part of
oneself, an external reference, like a car can become part of
the driver or a violin can become part of the musician.
Anything approaching the avatar is thus like anything ap-
proaching oneself, resulting in automatic speeding of re-
sponses. In this sense, our results may also be linked to work
demonstrating that objects presented near the observer’s hands
are being prioritized for processing (Abrams, Davoli, Du,
Knapp, & Paull, 2008; Brockmole, Davoli, Abrams, & Witt,
2013; di Pellegrino & Frassinetti, 2000; Reed, Betz, Garza, &
Roberts, 2010; Reed, Grubb, & Steele, 2006) and work show-
ing that such prioritization extends or shifts to areas that are
surrounding, or are reachable by, a tool held by the observer
(Berti & Frassinetti, 2000; Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, &
Costantini, 2013; Farnè, Iriki, & Ladavas, 2005; Maravita,
Husain, Clarke, & Driver, 2001). Single-cell recordings on
monkeys have shown, moreover, that visuotactile neurons ex-
tend their receptive fields from areas near the hand to areas
reached by a tool that is controlled by the hand (Iriki, Tanaka,
& Iwamura, 1996). Such findings suggest that the system
prioritizes objects that are available for (i.e., invite or afford)
action, and that this is the case not only for one’s own body,
but also for objects controlled by the body. Receptive-field
extensions may also provide a mechanism for identifying with
an avatar, since an avatar could be regarded as a more extreme
case of an object controlled by the hands, although it is more
remote than a typical tool. Also consistent with this, remote
interactions with objects have been shown to affect spatial
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perceptions of those objects (Davoli, Brockmole, & Witt,
2012; Lee, Lee, Carello, & Turvey, 2012).
In conclusion, humans are known to have a unique capacity
to personalize ourselves with other relevant objects or people
and to react to stimuli interacting with these external entities as
if those stimuli were interacting with ourselves. The present
findings lend support to the general behavioral-urgency hy-
pothesis proposed by Franconeri and Simons (2003) and,
more importantly, demonstrate that this hypothesis not only
holds for our own body representation, but can also be extend-
ed to external entities controlled by us. This reinforces the
notion put forward by the behavioral-urgency hypothesis that
more likely it is the perceived necessity for immediate action
that makes us respond faster, rather than pure physical stimu-
lus properties such as looming or expanding.
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